DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF ST. JOHN, ARCHBISHOP OF SHANGHAI AND SAN
FRANCISCO
ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN WITNESS (USPS 412-260)
is published monthly by St. Nectarios American Orthodox Cathedral,
10300 Ashworth Avenue North, Seattle, Washington 98133-9410.
POSTMASTER: Send address changes to
OCW, 10300 Ashworth Ave. N., Seattle, WA. 98133-9410
Fr. Neketas S. Palassis, Editor Email: frneketas@stnectariospress.com
Telephone (206) 522-4471; (800) 643-4233 U.S. & Canada;
Fax: 206-523-0550
AUGUST, 2004, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 8 (1539)
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
1. A Brief Account of the Consecration of Bishop Sergius
2. Book Review: Women in Purple: Rulers of Medieval Byzantium
3. A Timely Article on the Life of "Fr. Arseny" - An "Invented Literary
Figure"
4. Russia: Religion on a Leash
5. New Items from the Book Center
When you are in church, and are going to partake of the divine
Mysteries of Christ, do not go out until you
have attained complete peace. Stand in one place, and do not leave it
until the dismissal. Think that you are standing in Heaven, and that in
the company of the holy angels you are meeting God and receiving Him in
your heart. Prepare yourself with great awe and trembling, lest you
mingle with the holy powers unworthily.
Abba Philemon
1. A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE CONSECRATION OF BISHOP SERGIUS
(A more complete account will be forthcoming in the September issue of
the OCW.)
The consecration was a wondrous experience. Afterwards, we almost felt
like the Apostles after their descent
from Mt. Tabor. It was a glorious weekend. Metropolitan Makarios
presided and Metropolitan Moses was the concelebrant. Metropolitan
Ephraim was unable to attend because of his stroke. However, his
consent was given for the ordination. On Saturday night, Fr. Sergios
served his last Vespers as an Archimandrite. The next day at 7:45 we
began with the Episcopal Entry of Bishop Makarios. (At that time the
church was crowded.) Then the
hours and finally the three confessions of faith by the Bishop-Elect
and the Hierachal Divine Liturgy with the
ordination. We had seven priests, four deacons and several sub-deacons.
The choir from Portland joined our choir and thus we had a very good
sounded right and left choir. It was indeed a prayerful event.
(Priests were Fr. Ihnat, Assistant Priest, St. Nectarios Cathedral, Fr.
Andrew Boroda- Georgian Protopresbyter now serving in Minneapolis-, Fr.
Constantine Parr, Nativity of the Theotokos Church, Portland, Or., Fr.
Nicholas Liberis, St. Demetrios Greek Orthodox Church, Los Angeles,
Ca., Fr. Isaac, Abbot, Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Brookline, MA.,
Fr. Sergius Pelligrini of St. George Church, Salt Lake City, Ut, and
myself. Deacons: Fr. Aimilianos from St. Gregory of Sinai Monastery,
Fr. Christos Patitsas, Mt. Holly Springs, PA., Fr. Andrew., HTM., Fr.
Michael Whipple, St. Demetrios Greek Orthodox Church, Los Angeles.
Everything went so smoothly. We finished at 11:45 a.m., took numerous
photos and then went on the the Yacht Club for the banquet. We had 205
people there. Faithful came from Germany, Calgary, B.C., Northern and
Southern California, Arizona, Oregon, Maine, Pennsylvania, Minnesota,
Massachusetts, and Toronto, Ontario.
2. Book Review:
Women in Purple: Rulers of Medieval Byzantium By Judith Herrin
This 2001 book explores in depth the careers of three empresses of the
Byzantine (or Eastern Roman) Empire. The first is Irene, who reigned,
first as Regent, then as Co-Emperor with her son, Constantine VI, from
AD 780-797 and as sole Emperor (basileus, autokrator) in her own right
from 797-802. Euphrosyne (Irene's granddaughter) did not rule in her
own right, but was the consort of Michael II (r. 820-829) and was
instrumental in ensuring that her stepson, Theophilos (Michael's son by
his first wife), would take the throne
(r. 829-842). Theodora reigned in the name of her minor son, Michael
III (r. 842-867), from 842-856. This book is part of the movement to
bring to light the careers of significant women of history, but is
refreshingly free of feminist bias. Herrin has researched very
carefully her subjects and presents each in an honest and forthright
manner, as fully and three-dimensionally as the limited historical
sources of those
times (particularly sparse in the case of women) would allow. The
Byzantine Empire itself has only recently
become the subject of objective study, which is opening up the riches
of this Empire and its true place in history. The women of the Empire
are, however, generally passed over in silence by historians past and
present, or as in the case of Irene, dismissed in a page or two as
"scheming and duplicitous, consumed by ambition and ever thirsty for
power [bringing] dissension and disaster to the Empire" (Norwich, A
Short History of Byzantium, p. 115). This book, therefore, fills a
much-needed gap. Especially enlightening for Orthodox is the fact that
these empresses ruled during the Iconoclast years and were instrumental
in the restoration of true worship.
Irene was brought to Constantinople from her birthplace of Athens at
the age of 15 to marry the Emperor Leo IV. Herrin describes in detail
Irene's ceremonial roles as Empress and as mother of the Heir, and goes
on
to identify building projects ascribed to her, coins minted with her
likeness, and the responsibility she took in affairs of state, both
economic and military, after her husband's death. Irene's interest for
Orthodox lies in the fact that she took the initiative during her
Regency to begin the lengthy and politically
dangerous process of restoring veneration of the icons. Iconoclasm,
which was strongly and widely supported by the armed forces of the
Empire, was seen as divinely justified by the victories won over the
forces of Islam since its inception. Restoring veneration of the icons,
therefore, was a very risky path that could easily lead to the raising
of a rival Emperor by the army. Irene's first attempt, in fact, to
restore the
icons led to the brink of that, and she was forced to back down. Her
way of dealing with the troops involved
in the near-disaster was to deploy them to a distant region, ostensibly
to join battle with the enemy, then
disarm and disband them. Her second attempt was successful, having been
well thought out and carefully planned. Icon veneration was restored at
the Seventh Ecumenical Council in 787. Constantine VI's bid for sole
power in the 790s fell apart and he brought his mother back to help him
rule. Tensions continued to mount between them, however, and Irene, for
reasons not well defined (and perhaps unknown) ordered him blinded
and exiled in 797.
In 800, Irene became embroiled in intrigues and plots involving Pope
Leo III and Charlemagne, and a coup d'etat by her finance minister
Nikephoros, who was then elevated to Emperor, resulted
in her exile in 802. During the period when she and her son Constantine
VI ruled jointly, Irene arranged a marriage for him with
Maria of Amnia. This marriage was not happy, Maria producing only two
daughters, one of whom was Euphrosyne.
Constantine, purportedly for the reason that Maria had not produced a
son, divorced her and married one of his
mother's ladies-in-waiting, sending Maria and her two daughters into
exile in the convent on Prinkipo Island. Through 18 years of political
upheaval, during which four successive Emperors ruled and iconoclasm
(again, due to pressure from the army) was reinstated, Maria and
Euphrosyne (the other daughter had died young) lived
in their convent, all but forgotten by one and all. It is evident from
contemporary sources that Euphrosyne had taken monastic vows prior to
being recalled by the Emperor Michael II to be his second wife, thereby
gaining prestige and imperial legitimacy through marriage to a
porphyrogenita (a princess "born to the purple")
. It is, of course, unknown how Euphrosyne felt about this abrupt
change in the direction of her life, but it is evident that, shadowy as
she is in contemporary chronicles, she discharged her duties as Empress
in the
manner prescribed. As Regent for her minor stepson, Theophilos,
Euphrosyne protected his inheritance and arranged a suitable marriage
for him with a Paphlagonian woman, Theodora. It is unclear from the
sources if Theodora was brought up as an iconophile or not, as it is
also unclear whether she was chosen by Euphrosyne for this reason.
Unlike Constantine VI, Theophilos seemingly did not hold it against
Theodora that several of their first children were female, although the
birth of their only
surviving son, Michael III, was an event for great celebration.
Iconoclasm during this period was not pursued as passionately as during
its first manifestation, although the army - and therefore Theophilos -
persisted in maintaining that it was due to iconoclasm that they
remained victorious in the field. However,
this stand was weakened in 838 when a significant area of the Empire
was lost to the Arabs. Theophilos was already ill with his terminal
disease and died in 842, at the age of 29, leaving Theodora as Regent
for their
son. Theodora lost no time restoring veneration of icons. In this task
she was aided by reversals in war and the new perception that
iconoclasm was, in reality, the source of divine disapproval. Herrin
shows that Theodora saw iconoclasm not only as a heretical belief but
also as a divisive aspect that would ultimately
harm her son's Empire and thus something to be forcefully and
definitively rejected. Following a year or more
of intricate political machinations, on 10 March 843, a solemn vigil,
procession, and Liturgy were held complete with crosses, icons, and
candles, thus permanently overturning iconoclasm and restoring the
veneration
of icons.
Although Herrin's motive is to portray Irene, Euphrosyne, and Theodora
as three-dimensional players on the
historical stage - by examining their ceremonial role, their building
projects, and exercises in power, both in their own names and behind
the scene as wives, mothers, and regents - due to the events of that
period of history, she necessarily must also explore in depth their
role both in perpetuating icon veneration secretly
during periods of persecution and in authoritatively restoring the
veneration of icons. By extension, this expands to an examination of
the role of devout women in general in this process. Although many men
such as
St. Theodore the Studite, monks, and patriarchs upheld icon veneration
and suffered martyrdom and exile in
support of its restoration, Herrin believes that women played a perhaps
even stronger, though necessarily hidden, role in keeping alive the
tradition of icon veneration through the generations of persecution.
St. Theodore is known to have had a network of correspondence with many
iconophile women, which supports Herrin's
thesis.
Women in Purple is a well researched book, valuable both for
illuminating the lives and careers of three
significant yet virtually ignored women in history and for presenting a
little-known aspect of the Orthodox struggle for the veneration of
icons. Herrin's writing style is brisk and keeps the reader's interest,
moving easily between fact and assumption, but she has a disconcerting
manner of toggling between present and
past tense, to the point of annoyance, in this reader's opinion. This
book is well worth reading by anyone interested in Byzantine history,
women in history, and/or the iconoclastic years.
3. A TIMELY ARTICLE ON THE LIFE OF "FR. ARSENY", AN "INVENTED
LITERARY FIGURE".
Fr. Arseny has been made into a heroic figure by staff members of the
Moscow Patriarchate in order to undermine the Catacomb Church and
convince the faithful of the correctness of the position of Patriarch
Sergius who capitulated to the communist authorities. Fr. Arseny's life
published by St. Vladimir's Press was originally described by the Saint
Vladimir's Press as a fictional account of a priest's life under the
Soviet Patriarchate. Now the book is printed as an authentic account of
this priest's life. (Vertograd-Inform) 1 "A House Built On Sand" 2
Contemporary Mythology of the Moscow Patriarchate
When, in 1991, a group of Moscow priests who had at one time been close
to the late Fr. Vsevolod Spiller, and which later earned the nickname
of "the conservative Moscow Batiushkas", organized courses for
catechists, which within a year developed into the Theological
Institute for Catechists, many Orthodox Christians experienced a
feeling of genuine joy - that was a time of high hopes by many for a
much-awaited ecclesiastical revival. Alas! These hopes were not meant
to be realized. The rebirth did not follow, the leadership of the
Moscow Patriarchate pretended that the sin of Sergianism had long been
forgotten and forgiven, and as for Ecumenism, it does not represent any
danger whatsoever. Of course, this position - which was proclaimed
openly by the ecclesiastical bigwigs (let it suffice to recall the
conference of the representatives of the official jurisdictions of the
world, held in Thessalonica in May) - did not sit well with many
Orthodox, who began to seek an ecological niche wherein it would be
possible to openly confess Anti-Ecumenism, to stand for True Orthodoxy
against the spirits of the evil of this World which have gained
strength in the movement of neo-Renovationism and "Menism",3 and
wherein it would be possible to render due reverence to the New
Martyrs.
At that time it seemed that the newly formed St. Tikhon Orthodox
Theological Institute (STOTI) had taken up just such a niche. The
Patriarchate had not given its blessing for this new educational
institution very willingly, while the older ecclesiastical schools of
the MP began to look upon its first steps with even a certain degree of
envy. It [the Institute] has now been in existence for six years, and
it has become absolutely clear that these hopes were not justified.
Like unto the man in the Gospel parable who built his house on sand and
neglected a firm foundation, the creators of this Institute placed in
its foundation naught but sand, having forgotten that personal piety
and churchliness, of themselves, are not enough, and that not everyone
who says "Lord, Lord" is worthy of the Kingdom of Heaven.4 The spirit
of apostasy entered into the life of the Institute and has affected all
of its spheres.
The fact that the perpetuation and preservation of the tradition of the
Holy New Martyrs were declared to be the primary aim of the Institute
has served (and does serve) in the eyes of many as its chief defense
against the accusation of Sergianism. However, one ought to know, that
such an aim has been maintained from the very beginning precisely in
that very "Soviet", Sergianist spirit characteristic of the entire
post-perestroika policy of the MP. This spirit is manifested most
vividly in the suppressing and ignoring of the Royal Martyrs, the
retouching of the martyric confessions of the hierarchs who did not
recognize Sergius, as well as in the invention and popularization of
literary heroes, such as "Fr. Arseny". In the minds of those who
composed this hagiographic literary fiction, such "Patriarchate
Elders", as he, are supposed to witness to the holiness of Sergianism.
(I might add, that the matter here cannot be answered by referring to
the almost catacomb-like nature of Fr. Arseny's services, for he had to
commemorate someone at the Liturgy, and it is precisely this, as well
as his attitude to the God-hating regime and Sergianism, that the
authors have not spelled out.) The recently published fourth edition of
the book Fr. Arseny includes a newly written fourth part, which is full
of absurd inaccuracies and gaffes. 5
The apotheosis of this "legendizing" of literary experiments of the
staff of the St. Tikhon Orthodox Theological Institute was the
inclusion of "Fr. Arseny" in the list of historically documented New
Martyrs contained in the monograph published by STOTI: Those Who Have
Suffered for Christ. In the courses given at the Institute a jesuitical
selection is made of the testimony of the Holy New Martyrs: those
testimonies wherein Sergianism and the Soviet hierarchy are denounced,
are - with the blessing of the Father Rector - altered (as was edited
the testimony of Metropolitan Macarius against the falsehoods of
Sergianism), while the examples of hesitation and doubt of some Holy
Martyrs and Confessors are interpreted in an openly Sergianist spirit -
as a compromise with the Soviet regime. In the speeches delivered by
the heads of STOTI at the graduation exercises in 1997, there could be
detected a distinct tendency: "the true point" of the well-known
Declaration of Metropolitan Sergius was, says he, "the saving of the
Church", (Protopriest A. Saltykov); the Hierarch Peter (Polyansky) "in
actual fact, blessed" Sergius, (Hieromonk Damascene Orlovsky),6 and so
forth.
The anti-Ecumenism of this Institute has likewise proved to be
half-hearted and inconsistent. While in an outward fashion not
welcoming ecumenistic unity and syncretism, the "St. Tikhonites"
continue to carry out the wishes of the leadership of the MP and its
Department for External Church Relations [DECR], receiving at the
Institute the ecumenistic chiefs, and sending its staff members to
Ecumenical congresses and assemblies. For example, in 1997-1998,
fraternal visits to the Institute were paid by the Polish ecumenist,
Archbishop Jeremiah, the General Secretary of the WCC, Dr. Raiser,
Prof. N. Lossky,7 and a host of prominent Anglican and Roman Catholic
figures. The Institute enjoys the generous aid of the WCC and other
Ecumenical organizations; members of its staff attended the European
Ecumenical Assembly in Graz [Austria] and the Ecumenical Conferences in
Damascus and Geneva. But those instructors who dared to speak out
publicly against the ill-famed Chambésy Unia, have begun for
quite some time to feel themselves increasingly isolated. However, it
must be admitted that matters at STOTI have not yet advanced to extreme
forms of Ecumenism, such as intercommunion, yet, if commanded by the
leaders, even this is possible. The warmest of relations link STOTI and
the Patriarchate of Constantinople, its Metropolitan see in Geneva, and
the Ecumenical Orthodox youth organization "SYNDESMOS". The Institute's
relations with the DECR and [its head] Metropolitan Cyril (Gundyaev)8
remain quite cordial, for the leadership of the Institute cherishes the
hope of falling back upon the left, "Nikodimite",9 wing of the MP for
support, once Chisty Pereulok10 shall have ceased to bestow its
kindness upon them. The conservatism and "anti-Renovationism" of this
Institute constitute yet another myth, capable of misleading
naïve, simple folk. The new, reformed Renovationism and
Young-eldership11 of the "St. Tikhonites" arises, it is true, not from
lofty ideas, but from banal, human weaknesses, concerning which,
perhaps, there is no need to talk, if it were not for the fact that
these people function as instructors of courses on ethics.
The plague, which had attacked STOTI from its very conception, is the
irrepressible and boundless ambition and thirst for power of the
leaders of STOTI. (...) Older parishioners of the St.
Nicholas-Kuznetsky Church12 - whose senior priest is Protopriest
Vladimir Vorobiev, Rector of STOTI - observing with amazement and
horror the transformation of their parish during recent years, have
remarked: "We no longer have any parishioners left - just spiritual
children." Faithfulness "to Batiushka" has totally replaced
faithfulness to Christ and to His Church, while "Batiushka" himself
rapidly changed from a "spiritual father" into a "spiritual detective":
his m ethods of "father-confessorship" and the use made by him of
information gathered before the analogion during Confession, have
become the talk of the town. At a gathering of the younger priests of
the Institute on December12 of this year, Fr. Vorobiev bluntly demanded
that they divulge the secrets of Confession, if during it any sort of
sedition happens to be revealed, such as astrology or other
temptations, so that proceedings can be initiated towards the expulsion
of the "guilty" students from the Institute.
The moral environment at the Institute became critical when, about a
year ago, a search began for ways of linking its leadership more
intimately with various semi-, and quite simply, criminal structures.
As its great protector there appeared at the Institute the well-known
(in certain circles) "Archimandrite Sergius" of Velikie Luki, renowned
for the notorious affair concerning the burial within the caves of the
Pskov Caves Monastery of a certain "chap" (i. e., an ordinary
gangster), killed during a "clarification of relationships" in St.
Petersburg. A most prominent representative of the "New World Order",
B. B.,13 has taken to attending the St. Nicholas-Kuznetsky Church and
leaving contributions, while "Batiushka" - under the protection of the
Moscow criminal world - busies himself with the candle and icon
business at the Moscow cemeteries.14 Then again, some may object and
say to us that the gradual transformation of "fathers and brethren"
into "bosses and boys" in present-day Russia is a phenomenon both
universal and inescapable; however, for STOTI this process marked its
total merging into the mainstream of the internal life of the MP.
Having assimilated the good old ethics while still a subdeacon at the
Patriarchal Cathedral during the harsh years of the period of
stagnation [under Brezhnev], the Father Rector has quite clearly
demonstrated that a morally pure Theological Institute within the walls
of the MP is a myth. The contemporary "RF" [Russian Federation] is not
the historical Russia; the contemporary MP should not call itself the
Russian Church, and STOTI cannot lay claim to being "the continuation
of the tradition of Russian ecclesiastical education". The workings of
this apostasy are quite simple: since it is well-known that "no one can
serve two masters",15 then any activity whatsoever, be it ecumenical,
be it modernistic, becomes possible from considerations of profit or
gain. "Reasonable compromises" with the devil don't happen, that's just
how things are; and thus, the spirit of apostasy which has prevailed
for these last few years within STOTI, combined with the charismatic
ambitions of its leaders, should, so it seems, promote a re-evaluation
by the Orthodox people of the place of this institution in the life of
the Russian Church. Yu. Shch., Instructor at the St. Tikhon Orthodox
Theological Institute (STOTI) of the Moscow Patriarchate
NOTES
1 Vertograd-Inform (Russian edition: No. 12, December 1998, pp. 33-34;
English edition: No. 14, December 1999,
pp. 20-22.) Vertograd-Inform is a monthly journal published in St.
Petersburg, Russia. This letter was translated by Holy Transfiguration
Monastery, Boston.
2 Mt. 7:24-27. (Trans.)
3 A reference to the influence exerted by those members of the Russian
intelligentsia who had been followers of Fr. Alexander Men. Fr.
Alexander was brutally murdered in 1990. As much as one may deplore his
senseless murder, nevertheless, it cannot be denied that in his
preaching and writings he clearly expressed neo-Renovationist views
concerning the Orthodox Faith and the Church. (Trans.)
4 Mt. 7:21. (Trans.)
5 English edition: Alexander ___, Father Arseny, trans. Vera Bouteneff
(Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1998). The St.
Vladimir's Seminary Bookstore catalog for Winter 1999-2000 states that
this fictional account has been "our best-selling title for the last
sixteen months"! (Trans.)
6 Author, compiler, editor, and contributor to many books on the New
Martyrs published in recent years by the
Moscow Patriarchate. What does his statement above say for the veracity
and credibility of his works? (Trans.)
7 In contrast, see: Orthodox Christian Witness (Vol. 31, No. 26, 1998)
for a report on the less-than-friendly reception given Raiser & Co.
at the Holy Trinity-Saint Sergius Theological Academy. (Trans.)
8 KGB code name: "Mikhailov". (Trans.)
9 Concerning the infamous Metropolitan Nikodim Rotov, see: "On the
Death of a Soviet Bishop", Orthodox Christian Witness, Vol. 12, No. 10,
1978, pp. 1-8. (Trans.)
10 Clean Lane - the location of the residence and offices of the
Patriarch of Moscow. (Trans.)
11 The spiritually harmful practice by young, inexperienced clergy of
taking upon themselves the role of Eldership. Also an allusion to the
"Young Turks", and similar insurgent movements from within a group.
12 So called because it is located in the former Kuznetskaya Sloboda
(Smiths' Settlement), now found well
within the boundaries of modern Moscow. (Trans.)
13 Boris Berezovsky. [Secretary of the Executive Committee of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. He holds dual, Russian-Israeli,
citizenship. (Trans.)]
14 It is well known that despite the poor financial state of the
Institute - the average wage of whose instructors is equivalent to $10
a month (!) - Fr. Vladimir Vorobiev rides around Moscow in an elegant
Mercedes, with his own private chauffeur.
4. Russia: Religion on a Leash
Lawrence A. Uzzell (First Things, May 2004)
To those who value stability above all other political goods, Russia
should look more attractive now than at
any time since the early 1980s. That is especially true for
church-state relations. Religious liberty, after
shrinking since the mid-1990s, now seems to have reached an
equilibrium. A year from now Russians will probably not have any more
freedom of conscience than they have today, but they should not have
significantly less. Religious freedom differs in this respect from
freedom of the press, which is on a continuing downward trajectory.
The reason for the difference is that Vladimir Putin has achieved
everything he needs in church-state relations: he has no need to put
believers in chains, because he already has them on a leash.
It is inconceivable that a national leader of any major religious
confession in Russia - Christian, Muslim, Buddhist,
or Jewish - would energetically voice criticisms of the secular
government's policies on any issue that the Kremlin considers
important. Such leaders rarely make any statements about public policy
that could not have
been drafted by Putin's press office. In return, the Russian state
discriminates in favor of the mainstream leaders - not just against
other religions, but against rivals within their own confessions. It
favors some Jewish leaders against others, some Baptists against others
- and, of course, the Sovietized Moscow Patriarchate against rival
claimants to Russia's Orthodox Christian heritage. The state has also
increasingly
come to discriminate against religions seen as "foreign," even if those
faiths in fact have deep roots in
Russia's pre-Bolshevik history.
Putin's Russia is reviving the old habit of treating every social
institution, whether secular or religious,
as if it were an extension of the state. A characteristic example came
in February, when Russia's largest Old Believer denomination held a
nationwide council to elect its new head. Just before the council, Old
Believer priests across the country were summoned to visit the
headquarters of the FSB (the renamed KGB) in their respective
provinces. The secret-police officers asked the priests what they
thought of the mainstream
Russian Orthodox Church, asked whom they intended to vote for as their
new Metropolitan, and hinted at which
of the candidates the FSB preferred. The good news in this case is that
the Old Believers stayed true to their three-century tradition of
tenacious independence. The frail, elderly candidate favored by the
secret police lost by a wide margin to a young bishop, one of the Old
Believers' most effective evangelists. The older man even announced
that he would prefer to lose.
Will the state now intensify its discrimination against this most
distinctively Russian form of Christianity? That probably will depend
on how successful the Old Believers' newly elected Metropolitan Andrian
turns out to
be. If they come to be seen as a serious competitive threat to the
mainstream Orthodox, they can expect state harassment to grow - as it
already has for energetic Pentecostals and Jehovah's Witnesses.
Potentially the Old Believers have especially strong appeal: unlike
Protestants they share Russian spirituality's traditional
emphasis on liturgy and iconography, while unlike the Moscow
Patriarchate they are not tainted by servility to tyrants. At the same
time they are especially vulnerable to state repression, as they have
no lobby in the
West to mount international campaigns on their behalf.
Note that I use the words "discrimination" and "repression" rather than
"persecution." Persecution is what happens in China, where you can lose
your job or even be arrested simply for attending a prayer meeting.
Stalinist methods of that sort are almost nonexistent in today's
Russia: you can say whatever prayers you like within your own home, and
even invite your friends. But if you belong to a disfavored religious
minority
you may run into problems when you try to take your faith into the
public square. You may find it impossible to buy or rent a building for
your congregation's worship services, or even to conduct an open-air
revival meeting. In general, the less your denomination collaborated
with the old Soviet regime, the more likely you are to suffer
repression today.
An especially clear example is the independent (initsiativniki)
Baptists. Formally known as the Council of Churches of Evangelical
Christians-Baptists, they split from the larger and better-known
Baptist Union in 1961 after the latter accepted certain compromises
demanded by the Soviet state. For example, the Baptist Union agreed not
to teach religion to children - not even the children of its own
members. Boris Yeltsin's 1997 law on religion-a milestone in his turn
away from his own reforms of the early 1990s - formally stripped
the initsiativniki and similar groups of rights which the Baptist Union
retained, such as the right to distribute religious books. The
enforcement of that law has become harsher during the past two years,
and sometimes the independent Baptists have had to meet for worship in
forests, as they did during the Soviet years.
The 1997 law was explicitly xenophobic, creating extra regulatory
burdens on foreign religious organizations
and their representatives in Russia. But the first few years after its
passage gave rise to a traditionally Russian paradox. In practice,
domestic religious minorities found themselves facing more difficulties
than did
Western missionaries, despite waves of propaganda about "spiritual
invasion." Officials gave less energy to enforcing the law's formal
provisions than to continuing Russia's old practice of welcoming
visitors while trampling on its own subjects. Also, the law provoked an
unexpectedly strong response from the U.S. Congress,
the Vatican, and other Western institutions, and Russian officials
perceived these institutions as being primarily interested in the
religious freedom of their fellow Westerners, not that of purely
indigenous minorities. This perception, unfortunately, was and is
largely accurate.
Under Putin, however, foreign missionaries have lost ground. Economic
revival has made Moscow less dependent on foreign aid; the so-called
"coalition against terrorism" has created new opportunities for
deal-making; and Putin has been even better at personally charming
George W. Bush than Yeltsin was at wooing his predecessor.
Overall, foreign and domestic religious minorities now find themselves
on a more equal footing within Russia - not because the domestic ones
have more freedom than they did in the 1990s, but because the
foreigners have
less. Mark Elliott of Samford University, America's leading expert on
Protestantism in Russia, estimated last
fall that there have been "eighty-four known expulsions of foreign
religious workers (1997-2003), including fifty-four Protestants,
fifteen Muslims, seven Catholics, three Buddhists, three Mormons, and
two Jehovah's
Witnesses." He stressed that his figures "undoubtedly are incomplete
because of the desire of many to avoid
publicity." Most of these expulsions took place after Putin rose to
power in late 1999. Typically the
officials responsible have cited vague reasons of "national security" -
without producing any concrete evidence. Especially noteworthy were the
expulsions of five Roman Catholic clergy in 2002. That figure exceeded
the combined total from all previous years, and for the first time one
of the expellees was a bishop.
Now the situation has stabilized. We have seen no further expulsions of
Roman Catholic clergy since September
2002, but none of those previously expelled has been allowed to return.
Roman Catholic priests and nuns
continue to report harassment by local officials, such as protracted
wrangles over getting and renewing visas.
They continue to experience frustrations in seeking the return of
nineteenth-century church buildings which used to serve the pockets of
ethnic Germans, Poles, and other Roman Catholic communities scattered
across czarist Russia. These structures, built by and for Roman
Catholics, were confiscated by the Soviet state and often remain in the
state's hands to this day. (One should note that the Orthodox often
have the same problem, though not to the same degree. Much depends on
the political connections of the concert hall or other secular
institution now occupying what used to be a place of worship.) Last
year the Roman Catholic parish in Tula, about a hundred miles south of
Moscow, sought temporary access to their stolen church building so that
the visiting papal nuncio could say Mass there. The local authorities
refused, and the Mass
took place on the building's front steps.
With Roman Catholics, Putin has been especially successful at showing
the world a civilized face, visiting the
Vatican for friendly, well-publicized meetings with John Paul II, even
while the Pope's spiritual children were getting far from friendly
treatment back in Russia. The key to this double game, as to others
played by
the Kremlin, is a certain division of labor. Putin specializes in
telling the West what it wants to hear, while anonymous, taciturn
bureaucrats do the dirty work. This particular game includes a third
player, the Moscow Patriarchate, which plays the role of propagandist.
The denunciations of Roman Catholic "aggression" in Russia come from
the Patriarchate, while the concrete measures restricting Roman
Catholic activities come
from the state.
Unfortunately, the Vatican has played right into Putin's hands with its
excessive emphasis on the Pope's hoped-for personal visit to Russia. If
that visit had ever taken place, it would have been primarily a
feel-good media event, making it even easier for Moscow to continue
restricting the religious freedom of rank-and-file Roman Catholics.
Under Putin, corruption has continued to be one of the major realities
of Russian life, despite the highly publicized crackdowns on a few
carefully selected "oligarchs." Squeezing citizens for bribes is still
routine
among government officials, from the traffic police to university
admissions officers, and there is no reason
to think that church-state relations are an exception. This is a
difficult subject to investigate: both the official who extorts a bribe
and the clergyman who pays it want to keep the whole affair a secret.
But every now and then we get a chance to peak behind the veil.
For example, in 2001 the Moscow branch of the Salvation Army was
negotiating with the city bureaucracy responsible for registering
religious organizations. (Official registration is vital for activities
such as
renting buildings.) The key bureaucratic gatekeeper, Vladimir Zhbankov,
told the Salvation Army's Colonel Kenneth Baillie that the Army needed
more competent legal advice to help it through the application process.
Zhbankov then recommended a specific firm - one which he himself had
previously headed. Colonel Baillie decided not to accept this
outrageous recommendation, and the Salvation Army soon found itself in
a long court
battle threatening its very right to exist in Moscow. Not every
religious leader is as principled as Colonel
Baillie.
Father Simon Stephens, of the Church of England's sole Moscow parish,
had a similar meeting with Zhbankov about that parish's stalled
registration. Unlike his Salvation Army counterpart, the Anglican
priest
agreed to hire the bureaucrat's favored law firm. Within days the
parish's application was accepted.
The opportunity to win concessions by bribes is one reason, though not
the main reason, why Russia is not and
will not be an Orthodox Christian theocracy. Some articulate members of
the political and cultural elite want
Orthodoxy to become the new state ideology - not classic, patristic
Orthodoxy but a warped version that values nationalism and statism
above all else. But they simply lack the political weight to make that
happen.
Post-Soviet Russia, contrary to the triumphalist claims of both
Orthodox leaders and Western missionaries, remains a profoundly
secularized country. Only two or three percent of Russians are serious,
practicing Orthodox. These as a whole are even more politically
apathetic than their countrymen; attempts to form a united, influential
Orthodox political movement have yielded unimpressive results.
Committed atheists still occupy many influential positions, especially
in educational institutions. Moreover, making Orthodoxy the state
religion would create problems with Russia's huge Muslim minority,
about 15 percent of the population.
On the other hand, several federal agencies have signed formal
agreements with the Moscow Patriarchate giving
it special access to institutions such as prisons. Though Muslims and
even Protestants also have such access
in some provinces, they have no formal concordats with federal
ministries, and they are justified in worrying
about discrimination. Nevertheless, the religious minorities facing the
most serious threats to their very right to exist are not those whose
beliefs are most divergent from Orthodox teachings; despite hysteria
over
exotic groups such as the Moonies (a hysteria grossly disproportionate
to their tiny numbers), such cults have not faced much more difficulty
in practice than Protestants and Roman Catholics. Russia's bureaucrats
are most likely to restrict those minority faiths that they perceive as
undermining the material or ideological interests of the Russian state,
or those that simply refuse to provide bribes such as free trips
abroad.
The bureaucrats have no interest in enforcing Orthodox theology.
Unfortunately, some human-rights activists, such as my friend Lev
Levinson, who worked heroically against the repressive 1997 law, have
gone too far in setting themselves against Orthodoxy; they are
promoting not just freedom of religion but freedom from religion on the
French model. Such activists have opposed even the
slightest manifestation of religious symbolism at public ceremonies
such as presidential inaugurations; they
have also opposed any efforts to introduce Orthodox religious teaching
into the schools as an optional elective. (On the latter issue,
however, they are right to warn that what is optional today might be
made mandatory tomorrow.) Last year the Andrei Sakharov Museum in
Moscow triggered a totally unnecessary conflict
by hosting a tasteless modern-art exhibit that desecrated icons and
likened the Eucharistic wine to Coca-Cola.
Ultranationalist thugs invaded the museum and destroyed some of these
"art" objects. The ongoing scandal in
the courts has been a godsend to the enemies of religious freedom.
Although Russia is in many ways a post-Christian society, the political
constituency for an extreme, French-style separation of church and
state is even smaller than the one that would support a theocracy. The
Orthodox Church still commands tremendous instinctive loyalty as a
symbol of national identity; most
Russians want it to be respected and honored even while keeping it at a
comfortable distance from their own
lives. Thus it is not surprising that the Putin administration has
failed to produce a systematic, coherent policy on religion. Though
former officials of the Soviet-era Council for Religious Affairs are
scattered throughout the national and provincial power structures, they
have failed in their efforts to restore their old agency at the
national level; Putin's inner circle of advisers includes nobody who
specializes in religious affairs.
As Moscow correspondent Geraldine Fagan of the Forum 18 News Service
observed last summer, "Religious freedom
concerns are consequently resolved in an ad hoc manner, if the Kremlin
is involved at all, or are more usually left to government departments
and/or regional administrations." In Putin's Russia, violations of
religious freedom are not ideological but bureaucratic: the state seeks
not to invade the innermost recesses
of people's souls but to encourage and even subsidize religious leaders
whose public statements harmonize with its own policies, while
marginalizing others. It now has all the tools it needs to crack down
hard on those who get out of line on matters such as the military
atrocities in Chechnya. The more Putin succeeds in
consolidating his elected dictatorship, the less often those tools will
actually need to be used. What he wants is tame courts, legislators,
and news media. To a striking extent, that is what he already has.
Lawrence A. Uzzell is president of International Religious Freedom
Watch.
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